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Criminal Law-Deadly WeaponsClassification in North Carolina
The problem of the classification of instrumentalities used in the
perpetration of assaults as deadly weapons and the added question of
whether this classification should be made by judge or jury, provide
an extensive and often intricate subject of research for the attorney
seeking information concerning this branch of the criminal law. Fortunately for the North Carolina practitioner, the Supreme Court of this
state has from the time of its original consideration of these questions
laid down and adhered to sound fundamental rules and distinctions in
determining the deadliness of a weapon. It is the purpose of the writer
to enumerate these distinctions and to cite cases illustrative of each.'
The first general classification of deadly weapons is that into which
fall those instruments which are deadly per se. In State v. West 2 the
court enumerated as weapons deemed in law to be deadly a gun, a
sword, a large knife or bar of iron, or any other heavy instrument by
a blow from which a grievous hurt would probably be inflicted. In a
later case 3 the court named a pistol and a dirk-knife as instruments
which are of themselves deadly.
Where the indictment, under a count for assault with a deadly
weapon, stated merely that the assault had been made with "a club,"
the court held that the term "club" ex vi terndni imputed a deadly
weapon. 4 So also, the mere description of the weapon as an axe,
I N. C. PuB. LAWS 1919, c. 101, expressly made assault with a deadly weapon
punishable as a felony. The original legislation on this point was under chapters
seven and eight of N. C. PuB. LAWS of 1869-70, wherein assault with a deadly
weapon without intent to kill was made punishable by imprisonment in the
State's prison not to exceed five years, 'and assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill by imprisonment not exceeding ten years. These two sections
were repealed by Chapter 43 of N. C. PuB. LAws of 1870-71, and no further
legislation on this point took place until that of 1919.
There seems to be some conflict as to the gravity of the offenses of assault
with or without a deadly weapon under the 1868-69 provisions. In State v.
Swann, 65 N. 1C. 330 (1871), the court held that the offense of assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill, under the legislation of 1869-70, was not a
felony. However, in State v. Bentley, 223 N. C. 563, 27 S. E. (2d) 738 (1943),
Mr. Justice Seawell, in a review of this legislation, stated that the laws of
1870-71 reduced the offenses from felonies to misdemeanors, and he cited
State v. Tyson, 223 N. C. 492, 27 S. E. (2d) 113 (1943) and State v. Smith,
174 N. C. 804, 93 S. E. 910 (1917) as supporting this position.
It would seem that much of this uncertainty arises from the fact that it was
not until 1891 that the General Assembly classified as a felony any crime punishable by death or imprisonment in the State's prison, for the Swaun case was
decided before this classification was established. The Bentley case appears to
be the latest authority on the point, and therefore determinative of the question
as now presented.
For a general discussion of the classification of crimes see, Coates, Punishment for Crime in North Carolina (1938) 17 N. C. L. REv. 205.
251 N. C. 506 (1859).
'State v. Huntley, 91 N. C. 617 (1884); State v. Brewer, 98 N. C. 607, 3
S. E. 819 (1887).
' State v. Phillips, 104 N. C. 786, 10 S. E. 463 (1889).
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without any further description in the indictment, has been held to be
sufficient to charge assault with a deadly weapon. 5 The court has
also likened a blackjack to a shotgun or pistol which ex vi termini
6
import their deadly character.
The number of weapons which from their very nature may be
termed deadly, however, is comparatively few. More often the weapon
attains the status of a deadly one through the circumstances of its use.
Whether or not death results from the use of a weapon is not the
determining factor as to its deadliness. It appears clear that weapons
which are per se deadly may not always inflict fatal injuries, while an
instrument which does not possess inherently deadly qualities may
become deadly by the use which is made of it.
When the deadliness of the weapon must be deduced from the circumstances of use, proper consideration should be given to the size
and nature of the weapon, the manner in which it is used, and the size
and strength of the assailant and the assaulted. 7 When there is controversy as to these circumstances, the issue of the deadliness is generally one of law to be determined by the court.8 In State v. Smith0
the Supreme Court upheld the action of the court below in determining
as a question of law that a baseball bat, if viciously used, was a deadly
weapon. The opinion stated that where the alleged deadly weapon and
its manner of use are of such character as to admit of but one conclusion, the question is one of law, and the court must take the responsibility of so declaring.
However, where the weapon may or may not produce death or
bodily harm, according to the manner of its use, the part of the body
at which the blow was aimed, and the relative size and condition of
the parties, the question of the deadliness of the instrument is one of
fact for the determination of the jury.10 This rule was laid down in
one of the earliest reported North Carolina cases involving the determination of the deadliness of a weapon.': There a piece of curled hickory
about the size of a walking cane, used by a person much older and larger
than the assailed, was held to be a deadly weapon, the court stating that
it fell peculiarly within the province of the jury to ascertain whether
such a weapon, in the hands of the particular assailant, and in the
method in which it was used, was likely to produce fatal consequences.
State v. Shields, 110 N. C. 497, 14 S. E. 779 (1892).
State v. Hefner, 199 N. C. 778, 155 S. E. 879 (1930).
' State v. Sinclair, 120 N. C. 603, 27 S. E. 77 (1897).
' State v. Collins, 30 N. C. 407, 413 (1848) ("Whether the instrument used
was such as is described by the witnesses, where it is not produced, or, if produced, whether it was the one used, are questions of fact; but, these ascertained,
its character is pronounced by law.") ; State V. Speaks, 94 N. C. 865- (1886).

0187 N. C. 469, 124 S. E. 737 (1924).
"'State v. Watkins, 200 N C. 692, 158 S. E. 593 (1931).
"State v. Jarrott, 23 N. C. 76 (1840).
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To the same effect was the later case of State v. Huntley,12 where
a switch the thickness of a woman's little finger was found by a jury
to be a deadly weapon because it was applied violently and repeatedly
by the defendant upon the back of his frail wife. The Supreme Court,
taking into consideration the violence of the attack and the physical
advantage of the aggressor, upheld the finding of the jury. 18
Perhaps the most striking example of how the manner of use of
the instrument and the subject upon which it is used may determine its
deadly nature is the case of State v. Norwood.14 There the defendant
was indicted for the murder of her infant child, the death being caused
by pushing two pins down the child's throat. In finding no error on
the part of the court below in submitting the question of deadliness to
the jury, the Supreme Court followed the reasoning of the Huntley
case, supra, in holding that the question of whether an instrument is a
deadly weapon depends not infrequently more upon the manner of its
use than upon the intrinsic character of the instrument itself. It appears
clear that death might reasonably be expected to ensue from the pushing of a pin down the throat of an infant.
In the majority of the cases where the relative strength and size
of the parties to the assault are considered in the determination of the
question of the deadliness of the weapon used, the assailant's physical
advantage is evident, and the obvious lack of inherent deadliness in the
weapon is overcome by that factor. However, in the case of State v.
Sinclair'5 was demonstrated the converse of that situation. There the
assailant was a feeble, sickly boy of seventy-five or eighty pounds,
while the victim of the assault was a full-grown man who was being
held by two other men. The instrument used was a piece of pine
weather boarding five to six inches wide, a quarter of an inch thick,
and fourteen to eighteen inches long. It appears that the sole injury inflicted was a bruise on the assailed's leg. In holding the instrument
not to be deadly, the court took into consideration the size and nature
of the weapon, the manner in which it was used, the size and strength
of the party using it, and the person upon whom it was used. The test
seems particularly applicable and well applied here,
In the case of State v. Watkins16 the Supreme Court held as error
the instruction of the lower court that an assault when made with an
instrument such as a pair of handcuffs would constitute in law an
22 91 N. C. 617 (1884).
" A two and a half foot piece of buggy trace has also been held to be a
deadly weapon where the assailant was a strong, robust man and the victim was
v. Archbell, 139 N. C. 537, 51 S. E. 801 (1905).
woman.
a frail,
2,115weak
N. C.
789, 20State
S. E. 712 (1894).
25120 N. C. 603, 27 S. E. 77 (1897).
16200 N. C. 692, 158 S. E. 593 (1931).
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assault with a deadly weapon, the handcuffs not being presented in evidence and no evidence being introduced as to their size, weight, character or manner of use. Mr. Justice Clarkson dissented vigorously, basing his contention for the deadliness of the weapon largely upon the
proven physical incapacity of the victim at the time of the assault, it
appearing that he was then suffering acutely from heat prostration and
that he died therefrom twelve hours after the assault.
The two most recent cases on the question of determination of the
8
deadliness of a weapon are State v. Davis1 7 and State v. Harrison.'

In both of these cases, the former involving a hoe and the latter an ice
pick, the trial judge charged the jury that the weapon was deadly
per se, although there was no further particular description of either
instrument in the indictments, and upon neither trial was the weapon
presented for inspection by either judge or jury. In both cases the
Supreme Court held the charge to be erroneous, and held that the question of the deadliness of the weapon should have been submitted to the
jury under proper instructions. It would appear that the safest method
of determining the question of deadliness, where the trial court is uncertain of whether the weapon is deadly per se, is to submit the question to the jury under instructions directing them to consider the matter
of its use as well as other circumstances attending the assault and relevant to the question. For if the weapon is deadly per se, and the jury
decides the question of deadliness in the affirmative, the failure to so
instruct them will be cured by verdict.
Thus it can be seen that the court of last resort of North Carolina
has provided clear and sensible guideposts for both the practicing lawyer and the trial judge, both of whom are faced so frequently with the
question of the deadliness of a weapon in the prosecution of criminal
offenses. It is an ever present possibility that some new and previously
unclassified instrumentality may come before the court for classification. But when that event occurs, the likelihood of a proper determination of the question in the court below is greatly increased by its ability
to resort to such a long and unwavering line of well-considered authority.
CHARLES F.

COIRA, JR.

Automobiles-Recording of LiensCertificate of Title
Expanding production of new automobiles and its stimulation of
trading in used cars renews interest in the legal problems of the sale and
distribution of automobiles on credit. A timely reexamination of the
7222 N. C. 178, 22 S. E. (2d) 274 (1942).
N. C. 234, 34 S. E. (2d) 1 (1945).
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